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Introduction
Hosting a large international sport event promises not just the excitement of the event and media exposure for the host nation, but also the expectation of a positive return on the considerable investment associated with hosting these events. This is also true of the largest of these events, the FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) World Cup; and this is true for the 2006 hosts Germany which, though the largest economy in Europe, would nevertheless have hoped for a net benefit from hosting the World Cup (WC). The need for a positive net benefit from hosting the WC is even more urgent for South Africa, the host nation for the next WC in 2010. Though South Africa is also the largest economy in its region, it is the world's poorest region, and even within South Africa the challenges of economic development are acute.
Against the background of the empirical evidence of former World Cups and other large sport events which shows only limited positive effects on their local economies, 1 this paper examines the recent WC experience in Germany and offers comparisons and contrasts with the plans for the South African WC, at least to the extent that the latter plans are known. The paper highlights the potential for intangible benefits from hosting the WC with reference to a "feel-good" factor, in addition to both ex ante and ex post calculations of the usual economic benefits. These tangible and intangible effects are combined with the available information from South Africa to derive approximate cost benefit analyses for the World Cups 2006 and 2010. A final section attempts to initiate a discussion on the potential legacy of iconic architecture and its potential to yield positive economic effects from hosting the WC in South Africa.
Untangling the costs and benefits associated with the World Cup
From an economic point of view, and under present institutional arrangements, hosting a football WC can be viewed as a right which (the football federation of) the host country buys from FIFA. To maximise their revenue from this sale, FIFA organises a competitive auction in the form of bids by potential host nations. As a monopolist facing a competitive group of bidders, FIFA is able to extract much of the financial benefit of hosting the tournament from the bidding countries.
FIFA and the host nation sign a contract that regulates the flow of benefits associated with the tournament. In South Africa this "price" paid for hosting the WC and the likely negligible direct economic benefits have only recently entered the public debate. Most of the contractual obligations are similar to those enforced in Germany 2006, where these were also the source of public discontentment. For example, one such obligation concerned advertising, within a one-kilometre radius of the stadium and along all major access roads, is restricted to FIFA-endorsed enterprises, with all profits channelled to FIFA. Further, the host cities were required to set up (fenced-off) fan parks in which the same advertising conditions applied, for example restricting the supply of beer to the official FIFA partner, Budweiser. Other requirement include: the provision of dedicated lanes on highways for FIFA officials and teams, offices with unlimited telephone and internet access and other communication equipment, catering, and so on.
Due to the institutional structure of the World Cup (described above) the financial consequences of hosting the tournament can be analysed separately for FIFA and for the host country. 
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The potential benefits of hosting the tournament are also multi-dimensional, including:
direct pecuniary benefits associated with activities at the time of the tournament, expenditure by tourists 2 , teams, the media, and the Organising Committee; second, longer term benefits from the capacity constructed for the tournament and to accommodate, transport and entertain the visitors; possible technological and human capital spill-overs from this investment; and, finally, non-pecuniary benefits associated with hosting the tournament, including political gains, image effects 3 (Jasmand and Maennig, 2006 ) and a potential "feel good" factor. However, in contrast with FIFA, the host country faces a considerably larger burden of expenditure.
Expenditure and financing at the country level
Hosting a World Cup tournament requires investment in facilities and infrastructure and organisation expenditure. In the case of WC 2006 the latter amounted to a budgeted sum of € 430 million by the German OC, a breakdown of which is provided in table 1.
Preliminary reports of the OC show that the budget was more than adequate (DFB, 2006) . The OC made a profit of € 135 million, partly due to the near capacity sales of match tickets resulted in € 20 million of additional income. 4 After taxes on the profit (43,7 million. €) 5 and a partial payback of the contribution from FIFA (€ 40,8 million), a surplus of € 56,6 million could be distributed form the OC to the German Soccer Association (DFB) and the German Premier League (DFL).
6
While the financial information relating to World Cup 2010 remains sketchy at this stage, one problem is becoming obvious, i.e.: the South African plans to sell the 2,7 million tickets for a sum of R4,6 billion, resulting in an average ticket price of more than R1960 (€230 at R7.35:US$). Indeed, the OC proposed ticket prices of between 16 und 170 € 2 Expenditure from tourists is primarily centred in the accommodation and catering sectors, transport and retail (merchandise and souvenirs). In a macro-economic analysis of the additional impulses for the World Cup region with correct with and without cases, the expenditure of the local World Cup spectators ought not to be included, since they would pursue other activities involving expenditure if the World Cup were not taking place. Hitherto no indication exists that the local population spends more during the World Cup than it would otherwise.
3 For a description of the methods for the quantification and monetarisation of this kind of image effect cf. Maennig and Feddersen (2002) .
(qualification rounds) and 70 und 853 Euro for the final (Deister, 2006) . With a South
African unemployment rate of about 27% and median monthly incomes of R2000 these ticket prices seem to be ambitious. The entrance fees at SA´s premier league are usually at about R20.
7
In addition to the expenditure listed in table 1 the host country has to finance a number of other major expenditure items, which in the case of WC 2006 included: (i) Security at a expense of about € 90 million which was wholly financed from public funds; and (ii) the image campaign "Land of ideas" which had a budget of some €10 million and was co-financed by public and industrial funds and (iii), the cultural programme associated with the WC cost some €30 million 8 and was financed by issuing a WC gold coin for which the Treasury covered the cost of production and distribution and compensated the Bundesbank for the difference between selling price of the gold coin and the valuation of the gold in the Bundesbank's reserves.
9
Turning now to investment in the host country: Table 2 shows that in Germany around R12.5 billion (€1.4 billion) was spent on stadia, albeit in twelve World Cup locations.
10 Table 3 shows the planned expenditure on the 10 stadia that will be used in South Africa
2010.
It is important to consider the source of finance for this investment as the type of financing can have direct and indirect economic effects. 8 See also Dengel (2006) for the expenditure estimates for the rest of the paragraph.
9 Cf. Maennig (2003) for the scopes and limits of such special financial measures.
10 See www.stadionwelt.de and www.fc-hansa.de. For the 2002 World Cup, South Korea spent nearly US-$ 2billion, and Japan at least US-$ 4 billion for the stadia (Baade and Matheson, 2004: 345) .
11 In general, an increase share of private investment increases the multiplicative income and employment effects of stadia investments (Ahlert, 2001 ).
12 The federal government wanted to make sure that a second eastern German city would be host and decided to contribute € 51 million to Leipzig in that regard. In Berlin, the Federal Republic owned the run-down Olympic stadium of 1936 and the city of Berlin refused to contribute to the financing or to take over the possession of the stadium before it was renovated. (and maximum growth of more than 30%) in spectator numbers (Feddersen, Maennig and Borcherding, 2006) .
The income effects of the clubs should be even larger than the increase in attendance since new stadia lead to higher average price levels, especially in the VIP-and business seat areas. In addition there are (increased) naming rights income, and income from other events which hardly could take place in less modern and prestigious stadia.
In addition to the € 1.4 billion invested in stadia around € 2 billion was spent on WC related infrastructure in Germany. 15 It is significant that these cost exceeded the stadium costs despite the fact that the infrastructure that is relevant for large-scale sporting events (motorways and motorway junctions, railway platforms, car parks) already existed to a relatively high degree in Germany. There is thus every reason to pay the highest attention to the infrastructure costs, which are unlikely to be any lower than stadium investments.
A very different picture is unfolding with respect to the ten stadia planned for WC 2010 (Manuel, 2006) . Though these budgeted allocations are much higher than previously allowed, they fall short of the Minister of Transport's recent claim that transport infrastructure to an amount of R14.9 billion would be required leading up to the WC (though presumably not all of this would be directly associated with the tournament) (Phasiwe, 2006) . Further, the total amount officially budgeted for
does not yet cover the likely budgets for the stadia that have been reported in the South
African media. (Rahmann et al, 1997) , was commissioned by the DFB (the German Football Association). They traced scenarios for a decade following the tournament based on the number of WC venues (which were undecided at the time) and the spending behaviour of the World Cup tourists. Up until just before the WC these authors were quoting a positive economic impact of €1.5 billion as their "best guess".
More optimistically still, did the German Hotel and Catering Association and the Postbank (two organisations that were closely involved in the tournament) calculate their scenarios. The former proposed a figure of €3.4 billion based on the assumption of 3.3 million foreign visitors, spending an average of €150 to €200 per day (Unterreiner, 2006) .
The Postbank, a major sponsor, was even more upbeat, predicting an overall effect of €9 to 10 billion (or 0.5% of German GDP), with €6 billion the result of investment, €2 to 3 billion due to spending by residents and €1 billion as a result of spending by the 1 million foreign visitors assumed (Postbank, 2005a (Postbank, , b, 2006a ).
An even greater net effect followed from a scenario analysis by Ahlert (2001) . Building 
Ex post estimates of economic benefits
Though these ex ante forecasts for both the German and South African World Cups are modest when compared with predictions for other tournaments 20 , they still seem optimistic when compared with the economic impact calculated by ex post studies of large sports events. Table A1 in the appendix gives an overview of econometric analyses on the effects of sporting events such as the Olympic Games, sports leagues such as the Major Leagues in the USA and/or sports stadia. The majority of these studies suggest that the sporting events or sports stadia have little or no significant impact on regional income and/or employment. A number of works, particularly those of Coates and Humphreys, even arrive at significant negative effects.
To our knowledge, only very few studies find significant positive effects ex post. Baim (1994) finds positive employment effects for Major League Baseball and Football for 15 cities in the USA. Kang and Perdue (1994) find that the Olympic Games of Seoul 1988
20 For the WC 2002 in Korea and Japan, the Dentsu Institute calculated ex ante, that the Japanese share of the World Cup would generate a combined total of Yen1,400bn (at that time around $11bn) to produce a long term boost to the economy of Yen 3,300 bn, equal to 0,6% of japans GDP.20 Korea Development Institute even calculated a total investment of $2,6bn for South Korea, of which $1.54bn were used up by the stadia.. The Korean expenditure impulse was estimated at $6,2bn, the total impact for the Korean GDP even at 2,2% (Szymanski, 2002) . For the World Cup 1994 in the USA, an additional income of more than US-$4bn had been calculated (Goodman and Stern, 1994 The only two econometric studies published so far which consider football World Cups confirm the generally sober view on the economic effect of large sports. Szymanski (2002) collected data on the twenty largest economies measured by current GDP over the last thirty years, many of which have hosted the Olympic Games or the World Cup at least once during that period. Using a simple regression he comes to the conclusion that the growth of these countries was significantly lower in World Cup years. 23 Baade and Matheson (2004) show that for the 1994 World Cup in the USA, 9 of the 13 host cities suffered declines in growth. Overall the 13 locations suffered losses on balance of over US$ 9 billion.
21 Many non-economists would interpret such rents as a case against sports. By contrast, Carlinho and Coulson used the economist's idea of compensating differentials to interpret their findings as an argument for Mayor League Sports: the NFL presence makes the cities so much more attractive that the inhabitants are ready to pay more rents (although not having higher incomes). Taking the criteria of compensating differentials to the extreme, some of the "negative" findings of e.g. Coates and Humphreys could be interpreted as positive. And, even more embarrassing: the mentioned "positive" effects on income etc could be interpreted as negative.
22 In addition to econometric analysis with "realised data", there are studies for perceived benefits. Studies that examine the effects on an ex-post basis after the conclusion of the World Cup are rarer. Kim and Patrick (2005) analyse Seoul residents´ perceptions on impacts of the 2002 World Cup. Using a factor analysis, they found that residents positively perceived the impacts on the factors "tourism resource development and urban revitalisation", "image enhancement and consolidation", "economic benefits", and interest in foreign countries or their cultures". They also found a negative perception on "disorder and conflict", "traffic problem and congestion", and "negative economic perception", whereby the authors attribute the latter to the concerns about public costs for the investment or future utilization of the ten new soccer stadia after the World Cup. They found that females, especially housewives, generally had a more positive perception. They also found that the perception may vary over time. Three months after the event, "World Cup fever became diluted" (p. 37). Kim, Gursoy and Lee (2006) also arrive at unsatisfactory perceived economic results, but by contrast to satisfactory cultural results. Stadium costs, which were perceived as high, are explained via social exchange theory in connection with the economic benefits, perceived as unsatisfactory.
23 No significant effects at all are registered for the Olympic Games.
Ex post calculations of economic benefits for World Cup 2006
Though it might still be too early to complete a thorough ex post evaluation the effect of (Capazorio, 2006) .
However, a further two conditions are likely to cause particular problems in South Africa where the economy is currently growing at a rate of five percent per year: during the entire period of the tournament, no construction work is permitted in the host cities.
And the cities have to provide reserve capacity for electricity generation to compensate for any capacity shortfalls (a frequent phenomenon in South Africa). 29 The Cape Town newspaper the "Weekend Argus" summarized the situation as follows: "According to the contract it appears that the potential economic benefit will not go to the host cities and that local business will not profit from it".
Quantifying "intangible" benefits
The ex ante and ex post studies mentioned so far have neglected the "event utility" (benefit from experiencing the WC in one´s narrow, in the following also: "feel-good factor") of the population in the host country. In an ex ante contingent valuation method (CVM) study Heyne and Süssmuth (2006) Regensburg, Germany, on august 11th 2006 -one month after the end of the WC. The students were first informed about the concept of the economic benefit and the feelgood factor to be able to differentiate from other economic effects as e.g. additional income and employment effects. The students were also explicitly asked to abstract from the surprisingly good performance of the German national team during the WC and to assume that the team would have performed as well if the WC was held in neighbouring Switzerland, which has a similar climate, culture, language etc.
33
The classroom experiments were to use a) to evaluate the feel-good factor on the basis of the second alternative of CVM, the willingness to accept. In addition the target was b) to check whether the "feel good" might be an experience good of which the expected utility is increasing after consuming/ experiencing it once.
To do so, a first (control) group of 37 students was asked to cast their minds back to the months before the start of the World Cup and to imagine the situation depicted by
Heyne and Suessmuth where the WC might have been moved to Switzerland instead of Germany. They were asked to express which amount of money they would have been ready to pay to keep the WC in Germany. As in Heyne and Suessmuth (2006) 31 The study and results by Suessmuth and Heyne should not be confused with the ones of Dohmen et al (2006) who asked Germans one and a half weeks before the WC and every day after a match with the German team about the current and the (in one year) expected economic situation on an individual and economy-wide level. They found the success of the German team significantly increased all four categories of economic expectations. Dohmen et al intentionally asked for tangible effects.
32 Due to the composition of the participants the classroom experiment does not claim to be representative.
33 Indeed, the welfare effects of a good performance of the German national team appear to be higher. Rätzel and Weimann (2006) find that a WC final with German participation would have caused a willingness to pay of € 747 Million The willingness to accept was even up to seven times higher.
the value of €70 was used for further calculations), the participants with a willingness to pay of more than 70 € could name the exact amount they were willing to pay.
The average willingness to pay in our survey was €10.6, more than triple the result of Heyne and Suessmuth (table 4, 2nd column, 2nd row). The deviation was largely caused by two participants who answered that they would have had a willingness to pay of € 100. In the study of Heyne and Suessmuth, participants with a willingness to pay of more than €70 were counted as / restricted on €70. In a first correction the two participants with the WTP of € 100 were counted with a WTP of €70 as well. With this correction, the average WTP changed to 8,8. As an alternative correction, 5% of the sample, i.e. 2 participants with the highest WTP and 2 participants with the lowest WTP were "eliminated". The average WTP reduced to €5.96, now much nearer to the WTP found by Heyne and Suessmuth. The median value was -as in the study by Heyne and Suessmuth -zero. Thus, the class room experiment was largely able to reproduce the results of Heyne and Suessmuth.
The same group was also asked to express their hypothetical WTP with the knowledge of "today", one month after the end of the WC. The uncorrected WTP jumped to €26.5.
With to accounting of Heyne and Suessmuth for WTP > €70, it reduced to €21.7, and by alternatively eliminating the 5% outliers on both sides, it reduced to €22.8. The most important message might be that the WTP after the experience of the WC was at least 248% that of the WTP before the event. Two interpretations are at hands: First, the 248% percent difference might be regarded a "normal" difference between an ex-post realisation and an ex-ante expectation value which is a weighted average of possible outcomes. Second, the expectation value might have been equal to the ex-post realisation of benefits. But because of the uncertainty of outcome and with risk-averse individuals, the willingness to pay was lower than expected value of the event utility connected with the WC. According to the second interpretation, the WC seems to be an experience good were demand or the willingness to pay increases after a first consumption which reduces uncertainty. 35 The potential downward bias of WTP assessments has to be taken into account for other 36 and/ or future assessments.
35 A macroeconomic importance of experience goods was first mentioned by explaining hysteretic effects in international trade after exchange rate misalignments, see e.g. Baldwin and Krugman (1989) . To sum up, the results of Heyne and Suessmuth thus should be taken as an estimate of the lower bound of the contingent value of the feel-good factor. Comparing the feelgood WTP before the event with the WTP after the event or with the WTA before the event leads to an increased feel-good utility by a factor of at least some 2.5. Using this factor, the national value of the feel-good factor of € 260 million of Heyne and Suessmuth increases at least to €640 million. Compared to the other economic effects describe above, the feel-good is amongst the most significant.
Disappointing WC effects: Iconic architecture and urban economics as a way out of?
To condense these arguments into a systematic economic analysis, it has first to be recognised that not all of the above mentioned investments for stadia and infrastructure should be counted as "costs of the World Cup". To illustrate the point, the WC stadia in Hamburg and Gelsenkirchen had been constructed before the FIFA-decision to host the tournament in Germany was taken.
But even the investments in stadia, which took place after the decision, cannot be fully A similar argumentation applies for the above mentioned transport infrastructure if it was built in a sustainable way, i.e. providing benefits in connection with future uses of the stadia.
In sum, a German cost benefit analysis could look like this: the organisational costs of some € 430 million have been financed by revenues. Although investment expenditure for stadia and infrastructure was at some €3,4 bn., the relevant WC costs are negligible.
National income and employment effects are insignificantly different from zero. The feel-good effect is some €260 million or a multiple of it. Depending on whether the direct organisational and investment effects, and the indirect national income and the feel-good effects are aggregated on a gross or a net basis, the cost benefit analysis results in a highly efficient or an insufficiently activity: In the first case, the benefit/cost ratio is at about 260/0, in the second at about 690/430. Compared to a German GDP of about € 2442 billion the gross effects of some € 690 million at maximum are negligible anyway and thus do not stand in contrast to the empirical findings on the effects of large sport events mentioned in table A1.
Two arguments might be important with respect to the missing positive effects -and its limited transferability to the South African case: First, Germany and many industrialised countries (on which the studies in this literature are based) enjoy very ample provision of sports. In Germany for example there are 127 000 sports venues, including 35 000 sports halls and another 9 000 halls used for ice hockey or shooting. The figure also includes 400 multi-purpose sports halls with a spectator capacity of at least 3 000.
Sports stadia, like most production factors, are subject to the law of diminishing returns.
This includes the possibility that -given a correspondingly high level of provision -(additional) sports venues display a negative social marginal productivity. The reasons for this may for example be the follow-up costs of running and maintaining the venues, which represents a considerable burden to the local authorities concerned. 37 For countries, such as South Africa, that do not have a comparably dense provision of sporting facilities at their disposal, these costs are probably not directly transferable.
Second it has to be considered that the sports venues studied might hardly stimulate any positive effects to the regional economy, since they were not built with this aim in mind.
The aim during planning was usually to maximise the profit margins of the professional clubs, rather than urban development. To this end the club managers have to restrict their expenditure to the extent necessary to ensure the satisfaction of the fans. It is not their job to formulate urban and regional policies, make stadium architecture more interesting from an urban planning perspective or to realise "external" effects for the regional economy that are of no direct benefit to their clubs. As a result the stadia are often situated in peripheral areas of the city and are not systematically embedded in any way in urban planning. The stadia display an aesthetic that can best be summed up as "functional", and "safe from hooligans". They are not usually attractive places, in which people congregate outside of opening hours, or where retail traders gather and/or the value of the surrounding properties increases.
However, the "functional" design of stadia should not be attributed to club managers alone: local government city planners should share the responsibility (and the cost) of developing stadia that capture the externalities associated with more sophisticated architecture (and in some cases, better locations). For example, Munich's Arena cost around €280 million, whilst the average for the other World Cup stadia in Germany stood at around €100 million. Given the fiscal concerns in many industrialised countries, politicians would find it difficult to support further public funding for sport stadia.
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37 An extreme example of this is the ice arena in Bad Reichenhall in southern Germany, which collapsed due, amongst other things, to a lack of maintenance. Several people were killed.
38 An increased level of positive economic effects emanating from stadia thus presupposes that the population must accept the message that stadia that are simply efficient from a sporting technology While the direct economics impact of hosting such events have often been muted, as discussed above, there is potential for exploiting the opportunity offered by a large sporting event to create an architectural legacy with lasting positive impact. Success in this regard is often associated with so-called "iconic" buildings.
Iconic design
A clear definition of "iconic" buildings does not yet exist, but consideration of examples of this kind of building (e.g. the Sydney Opera House, the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao, the Centre Pompidou in Paris, the Berlin Philharmony) does reveal certain common design characteristics: They display an architecture that, at least at the time of planning, was regarded as highly innovative, often apparently "impractical" and "nonfunctional", but which is nevertheless unique and striking. The planning is often so unconventional that citizens unite in their resistance to it, resistance which however gradually gives way to a feeling of regional pride, inspiration and identification.
In every case the innovative design helps the building succeed in becoming a landmark and part of the memorable character of their cities, which in turn succeed in "getting their name on the world map", i.e. achieve the desired image effects (Maennig and Schwarthoff, 2006) . Iconic buildings provide an aesthetic focal point for a city and could become a springboard for other urban developments and recreational facilities, attractive for locals as well as international tourists.
In South Africa there is evidence that the World Cup might be used as a vehicle to attempt inducing positive urban economic effects: The new King Sezangakhona stadium in Durban is being designed as an "iconic" building with a 30 storey arch stretching its entire length (SAPA, 2006) and (Jones, 2006b) . Not just in Durban, but elsewhere too in the host cities of South African 2010, the architectural plans (published so far) do seem different from the "functional" stadia projects of former World Cups (Maennig and Schwarthoff 2006) .
But in South Africa, as elsewhere, there is also resistance to "iconic" projects: the residents of Greenpoint in Cape Town are evidently less willing to tolerate, much less to point of view may in some cases already require public funding. If it is intended that the architecture and location should also stimulate positive urban development processes, then this necessarily involves additional costs.
pay for, an iconic stadium. Indeed, pressure from local residents has already resulted in an instruction to the architects to "moderate" their design for the new stadium (Schaug, 2006) .
Location and urban economics
On the micro level, it is a common characteristic of iconic buildings that they are located at (or within walking distance from) the city center, with some directly situated at the A number of criteria influenced the final selection of host cities, including: the stadia, their capacity and other facilities; the quality facilities for the media and VIPs; transport infrastructure connecting the stadia; environmental considerations; and the scope for creating a good atmosphere during the tournament (Niersbach, 2002) . In addition to these the OC also acknowledged that political considerations would also be taken into account. For example, the OC was committed to selecting a second host city in Eastern
Germany (in addition to Berlin).
However, the criteria for selecting the host cities did not include any specific consideration of the likely net economic impact on national or regional income (or employment), nor was the view of, inter alia, Rahmann et al. (1997) accepted that ten host cities rather than twelve would raise the economic benefits of the tournament. An ex post evaluation of the economic impact of the world Cup has to acknowledge that economic considerations played only a limited role in the ex ante allocation of host cities.
In contrast with the German OC's decision to allow 16 cities to compete for a final 10 or 12 host slots, the South African OC had decided on a final list of 10 stadia in 9 municipalities by the middle of 2006. Five of these stadia are existing stadia that will be upgraded to meet FIFA's requirements (including the minimum capacity of 40 000) and five stadia will be newly built. Two of the newly built stadiums (in Cape Town and Durban) replace existing sport stadiums. Table 3 shows the host cities and stadia for South Africa 2010 and also indicates whether a stadium will be newly built or will be an upgrade of an existing stadium.
No formal list of criteria used to determine the host cities and venues in South Africa has been made available publicly. But it is possible to infer the criteria from the actual cites as well as from other large international sport events that have been hosted in South
African over the last ten years, including a rugby world cup (1995) and a cricket world cup (2003) . Important criteria seem to have been: first, the existing infrastructure (stadia, transport and tourist facilities) in major metropolitan areas; second, the geographical spread of stadiums across the nine provinces of South Africa; and, third, the goal of encouraging economic activity in underdeveloped rural areas due to the large gap between urban and rural incomes and wealth in South Africa.
It is possible to split the ten stadia planned for the 2010 tournament into three groups each of which satisfy one of these three criteria. Further relevant criteria include the wish to close the gap between the excellent facilities for rugby in the country and the relatively inferior facilities for football and the wish to spread the ownership of these stadia more broadly, i.e. the new stadia will be state owned, "on behalf of the people", as Gert
Oosthuizen, the deputy minister for sport and recreation, argued in Parliament on announcing the final host cities for the tournament (Coetzee, 2006) .
Turning to the stadia: first, South Africa has three major metropolitan areas (Gauteng, Cape Town and Durban) and it is unsurprising that 4 of the stadia (two of them new) are located here. These are also the area served by the country's three major airports, and a new international airport (the King Shaka airport) will be built north of Durban in time for the tournament. The bulk of the country's hotel accommodation is also located in these metropolitan areas. 
Conclusions
The OC of the World Cup 2006 in Germany had an operating budget of € 430 million on which it was able to produce a surplus. In addition to the cost incurred by the OC, public funds financed some € 1,4 billion investment in sport stadia and some € 2,0 million for the related infrastructure. This investment created infrastructure for which there is a demand and the projects are economically sustainable. For this reason the capital layout can be regarded as costs of the World Cup only to a very limited extent, which is indeed covered by the rent payments form the OC to the clubs.
Financing for the WC in South Africa 2010 looks different. Current investment plans budget R8.4 billion for stadia and R6.7 to 14,9 billion for infrastructure, well above the R818 million which the South African delegation budgeted for stadium investment at the time of the tournament bid. Private financing is hardly available due to the weaker financial position of the local soccer clubs.
A first analysis of the economic impact shows that some sectors of fairly small importance to the German economy have profited from having the World Cup in Germany. And the evidence is mixed for the hotel and tourism sector which is usually expected to be amongst the main beneficiaries of such an event. National occupancy rates declined by 2.7 percentage points compared with June 2005, and in Berlin and
Munich -the two cities with the largest number of matches -occupancy rates dropped by 11.1 and 14,3 percentage points. However, hoteliers were able to compensate for the lower occupancy to an extent by raising prices.
On an aggregated level, neither merchant sales nor employment showed significant effects which does not stand in contrast to former empirical findings on the effects of large sport events.
We nevertheless are less sceptical than other academics towards large sport events due to two arguments: First, the event benefit or feel-good utility is often omitted from the cost-benefit analyses; yet compared to the other economic effects describe above, the feel-good utility is amongst the most significant. It might be difficult though to estimate it correctly for ex-ante purposes: Large Sport events like World Cups or Olympic Games might be experienced goods where demand or the willingness to pay increases after a first consumption which reduces uncertainty. The potential downward bias of willingness to pay assessments has to be taken into account for future assessments.
Second, to date stadia construction has often been driven by the need for financial return at the club level, and only rarely pursued the target of positive effects for the region.
Future projects that draw on the insights form urban economics with the aim of a more effective integration of stadia with urban needs holds the promise of enhanced externalities. "Iconic architecture" with its highly innovative, often apparently "impractical" and "non-functional" designs deserve special interest in this regard. Iconic buildings might be able to create a feeling of regional pride, inspiration and identification, to become a landmark and part of the memorable character of the cities, which in turn succeed in "getting their name on the world map". This effect might be helpful for some of the South African host cities which are large, dynamic, beautiful and important -but not yet prominent internationally.. 
